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Actuarial Power, Asymmetric Warfare, Chokepoint Warfare, Critical Infrastructure, Economic Contagion, Energy Geopolitics, Energy Security, Financial Derivatives, Global South Blackouts, Imperial Overreach, Infrastructural Violence, Insurance Capital, Late Industrial Modernity, Maritime Straits, Network Fragility, Oil Empire, Strait Of Hormuz, Supply Chain Risk, Systems Collapse, Technocratic Governance
Modernity at the Chokepoints
What does it look like when a civilization ties its survival to a handful of narrow straits, buried cables, cloud clusters, and chemical plants—and then starts sawing at them in a fit of imperial politics and wishful thinking?
We are used to talking about “complex systems” and “global interdependence” as if redundancy comes for free. The picture in our heads is a web: many nodes, many links, no single point of failure. But that is not the world we have actually built. What we have is closer to a suspension bridge: a vast weight hanging from a few load‑bearing cables. The Strait of Hormuz. Gulf Coast refineries and LNG terminals. A couple of global fertilizer giants. Three cloud providers. A sparse grid of undersea fiber. A handful of global dollar‑clearing banks.
When those cables fray—through war, sanctions, climate shocks, or cyber sabotage—the deck does not sag gracefully. It drops.
The Strait That Moves the World
Start with the obvious: oil and gas.
On a map, the Strait of Hormuz is a narrow cut between Iran and Oman: 21 miles wide, two shipping lanes in, two shipping lanes out, plus a buffer. In energy reality, it is the throat through which roughly a fifth of globally traded crude and an enormous share of liquefied natural gas pass on their way to Asia and Europe. Close it, even partially, and a local skirmish in a narrow strait becomes a global energy shock, ripping through fuel prices, freight costs, and food bills in every time zone.
As we have already discussed, the current Iran war has made that concrete. Mines and anti‑ship missiles in and around Hormuz do not have to stop every tanker. They only have to raise the perceived risk high enough that insurers pull coverage, shippers refuse cargoes, and navies escort only the most politically essential flows. A two‑ or three‑million‑barrel‑per‑day disruption for weeks is enough to send oil into triple digits and LNG into panic territory. A deeper, longer shock starts to look less like a “market dislocation” and more like enforced rationing: governments diverting scarce fuel to militaries and critical infrastructure, leaving households and small businesses to absorb the hit.
We have seen sketches of this before: the tanker wars of the 1980s, the price spike after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, the crunch that followed Russia’s full‑scale invasion of Ukraine. What is different now is the degree of concentration. Over the past two decades, as majors chased shareholder returns and states leaned on “just in time” trade, spare capacity and geographic diversity have withered. Fewer refineries. Bigger tankers. More gas tied up in slow‑moving LNG fleets. Less slack in storage.
A civilization that still runs its transport, agriculture, plastics, and much of its grid on hydrocarbons has chosen to confine an ever‑larger share of that metabolism to a few maritime chokepoints. Hormuz is the most dramatic, but not the only one. The Strait of Malacca, Bab el‑Mandeb, the Turkish Straits: each is a place where bottleneck geography and dense energy traffic now sit directly on top of each other. Each is a point where a regional war, a blockade, or even a credible threat can pull on cables that run into every supermarket and hospital on earth.
Food on a Single Chain
If energy is the master resource, food is the one that turns abstraction into panic. Here, too, what we call a “network” is really a handful of suspension ropes with everything hanging from them.
Global grain and oilseed markets depend heavily on a few “breadbaskets”: the U.S. Midwest, the Black Sea, Brazil and Argentina, parts of India and China. In a stable climate, localized drought in one region can be smoothed by surplus elsewhere. In a destabilized climate, that comforting picture starts to fail. Extreme heat, droughts, and floods are increasingly synchronized across regions by planetary‑scale shifts in jet streams and ocean currents. Researchers have a phrase for what happens when these patterns line up the wrong way: multiple breadbasket failure. Instead of one bad harvest, you get several at once.
The building blocks are already visible. Heat domes over North America, unprecedented drought in the Horn of Africa, flooded fields in Pakistan and along the Yangtze: each of these has happened in isolation. Put two or three together in the same growing season, layered on top of depleted grain stocks and already‑high prices, and you are no longer talking about localized hunger. You are talking about systemic scarcity.
And that is before you trace the chain upstream. Modern agriculture does not run on rain and muscle. It runs on fossil‑fuel‑derived fertilizers, diesel for tractors and harvesters, gas‑fired power for irrigation pumps, refrigerated logistics, and global shipping. Ammonia plants that turn natural gas into nitrogen fertilizer are chokepoints every bit as crucial as straits. So are export terminals on the Black Sea and Gulf Coast, and the small handful of companies that dominate grain trading. When energy prices spike, or when sanctions and war interrupt flows through a corridor like the Black Sea, the effect is not just a headline about “higher prices.” It is households in importing countries quietly dropping meat from their diets, then eggs, then fresh vegetables, then calories.
In theory, a diversified civilization could absorb such shocks. In practice, the food system has followed the same logic as energy: consolidation, scale, and efficiency first; resilience later, maybe. Fields planted fence‑to‑fence with a single crop variety; animals raised in vast confinement operations that depend on continuous feed deliveries; supermarket chains with centralized distribution centers and minimal backroom storage.
The result is that it does not take an end‑of‑the‑world drought to stress the system. A few failed harvests, a fertilizer crunch, or a war that chokes a critical export route are enough to push tens or hundreds of millions of people out of food security and into some combination of malnutrition, migration, and revolt.
The Cloud Under Our Feet
If oil and grain are visible chokepoints, the digital ones are largely invisible. They are no less real.
Every time you tap a card, check a lab result, book a truck, or dispatch an ambulance, you are depending on computers that live somewhere else. For a while, we were happy to regard “the cloud” as a comforting abstraction. Now it is a specific handful of hyperscale data centers, network backbones, authentication services, and software supply chains—each operating under the control of a few firms and, ultimately, a few states.
Hospitals, water utilities, electricity system operators, ports, railroads, and refineries increasingly run their operations through cloud‑hosted platforms and common software libraries. Identity and access management is outsourced to third‑party providers. Billing systems, maintenance logs, and industrial control interfaces sit behind the same handful of login pages. It is efficient, standardized, and—until it fails—invisible.
We already have hints of what a serious digital chokepoint failure looks like. Ransomware and supply‑chain attacks that encrypt hospital networks and force staff back onto paper. Payment system outages that strand travelers and jam supermarkets. Software bugs in a widely used library that propagate out into thousands of organizations at once. These are early warnings, not worst‑case scenarios.
The lesson from Stuxnet and the Ukraine grid attacks is that determined states can target not just the accounting layer, but the control layer: the switches and valves and breakers that keep electricity, water, and fuel moving. Code can blind operators, feed them fake readings, run equipment to failure, and trigger blackouts at the grid level. As more of the world’s critical infrastructure is wired into shared digital ecosystems—common protocols, shared platforms, centralized monitoring—the distance between “a cyber incident at a vendor” and “no power in a third of the country” shrinks.
We are building something much like the energy and food systems: vast complexity perched on top of a small number of concentrated, opaque, and mutually entangled cores.
Signals from the Cables and the Grid
If you want to see this fragility in pure form, you do not have to look at tankers or grain silos. You can look under the sea and into the wires.
The undersea‑cable grid that carries nearly all international internet traffic is marketed as a redundant mesh. In practice, much of Asia, the Gulf, and East Africa now rely on a few busy corridors where dozens of cables are bunched together on the seafloor. When several cables in the Red Sea were cut recently—most likely by wayward anchors rather than deliberate intent—connectivity across parts of the Middle East and South Asia degraded in hours, and traffic had to be hurriedly rerouted thousands of miles around Africa. A few severed fibers in a contested chokepoint turned into slower payments, dropped calls, and stalled business on multiple continents, with nobody quite sure whether it was an accident, an attack, or something in between.
On land, the electrical grid is undergoing a similar stress test. Growing fleets of data centers, AI clusters, and electrified everything are pushing peak demand up faster than new firm capacity and transmission are being built. At the same time, extreme weather—heat domes, polar outbreaks, inland hurricanes—is hammering aging lines and transformers that were installed decades ago for a milder climate and a flatter load curve. Each year, reliability assessments quietly expand the list of regions at “elevated risk” of rolling blackouts if a cold snap or heat wave hits at the wrong moment. The supply of electrons still looks adequate on annual spreadsheets. The real fragility shows up in the hour‑to‑hour choreography needed to keep a sprawling, under‑maintained machine balanced on the edge of collapse.
Critical to Whom?
States and corporations are not blind to any of this. They simply draw different conclusions.
Security assessments now openly talk about “globally critical infrastructure”: assets and corridors whose loss would have cascading international effects. Government studies list familiar categories—energy, transport, communications, finance, health, food—and then note, in careful language, that these systems are aging, increasingly digitized, more exposed to climate extremes, and deeply interdependent. Corporate risk reports use phrases like “concentration risk” to describe the financial exposure that comes from relying on a handful of providers for cloud services, logistics, or payments.
Then, in the next breath, policy and business practice push further in the same direction. Ports are privatized and consolidated, refineries mothballed in favor of efficient mega‑plants. Cloud workloads are migrated to one or two platforms because vendor diversity is “too complex.” Fertilizer and seed markets are allowed to coalesce into a few global players because that is what the spreadsheets demand.
From the perspective of a balance sheet, this makes sense. Fixed costs fall. Margins rise. From the perspective of a civilization, it is the equivalent of stripping load‑bearing walls from a building to make the floor plan more open. Day by day, nothing seems to change. Then one day, something gives.
Empire at the Switches
If you wanted to design a world in which collapse could be triggered cheaply for political gain, you would start by concentrating essential flows and then arming a few actors with the tools to disrupt them. That is more or less the world we now inhabit.
Maritime chokepoints are guarded—or threatened—by navies. Financial rails are supervised by a few central banks and clearinghouses. Cloud centers sit comfortably within the jurisdictional reach of major powers. Undersea cables run through the exclusive economic zones of states that field submarines and listening posts. Fertilizer and grain flows answer to export controls and sanctions lists.
It is not hard to see how these structures get used. Sanctions on oil and gas become routine instruments of policy. Grain shipments are halted or “weaponized” in conflicts. Payment networks are turned off for entire countries. Cloud services are restricted or compelled into surveillance partnerships. Navies quietly signal which straits will be considered off‑limits in the event of war.
For the populations on the receiving end, none of this looks like an abstract “decoupling.” It looks like power flickering, fuel lines lengthening, prices spiking, shops emptying, and medical care degrading. It looks like the blackouts in Cuba today, played out at different scales and latitudes: an energy‑dependent modernity pushed over the edge by a deliberate tightening of the chokepoints it cannot live without.
The temptation in rich capitals is to assume that this weaponization will always run one way: from core to periphery, from empire to small states. The Iran war and Hormuz crisis are already a counterexample. So are Russia’s gas cut‑offs to Europe, Houthi attacks in the Red Sea, and the repeated cable cuts and port disruptions that follow every serious regional war. Peripheral actors can pull on the cables too. They may not own the cables, but they can still tangle and sever them.
After the Holocene
Civilization did not rise on a random roll of the geological dice. It was granted a long, improbable grace period: the Holocene, roughly twelve thousand years of unusually gentle, predictable climate in which temperatures, rainfall, and sea levels wobbled but did not lurch. For the first time in our species’ history, you could plant in the same valleys for generations, build canals that did not routinely dry up or wash away, store grain against next year instead of the next thousand surprises. Cities, empires, fossil‑fuel industry, global trade: all of it is scaffolding bolted onto that brief plateau of planetary calm.
What we call “modernity” is not just machines and markets. It is a particular style of risk‑taking that only makes sense when the background planet is quiet. You can afford to concentrate your power plants on low‑lying coasts, to run just‑in‑time grain shipments through a handful of straits, to route nearly all digital traffic through a few cable corridors and data centers, when the odds of simultaneous drought, flood, heat wave, and storm are vanishingly small. The Holocene’s gift was not abundance so much as reliability.
That gift is being withdrawn. We have already shoved the Earth system outside the bounds that defined the Holocene’s “safe operating space”: hotter atmosphere, wilder water cycles, acidifying oceans, unraveling ecosystems. The statistics are still catching up, but the lived pattern is clear enough: record heat on aging grids; once‑in‑a‑century floods arriving twice in a decade; failed harvests and displaced millions moving into cities whose own lifelines run through stressed rivers and contested straits. Under those conditions, the architecture we built for a calm planet does not merely strain. It turns predatory. Each extra degree, each lost forest, each collapsed fishery weighs hardest on the same narrow set of chokepoints you have been asked to trust with your electricity, your food, your savings, your medical care.
We are not just leaving the Holocene. We are entering an era in which the background climate and the foreground empire are aligned in one direction: towards more frequent, more geographically synchronized blows to the load‑bearing cables of our civilization. The old reassurance—that the planet itself would remain a neutral stage on which human politics played out—is gone. The stage is now an actor, and it is pulling on the same ropes.
Collapse, Reframed
When people talk about the “collapse of modern civilization,” they often mean an undifferentiated fall: climate tipping points, resource exhaustion, some generalized sense of “systems breaking down.” The reality now coming into view is more specific and more legible.
We do not need a simultaneous failure of everything, everywhere. We need a handful of critical nodes to fail in the wrong sequence. A major energy chokepoint like Hormuz. A cluster of refineries or LNG terminals pushed offline by a combination of storm surge and war. A year of overlapping harvest shocks plus export bans. A crippling outage or attack on a dominant cloud provider that also touches industrial control systems. A dollar‑funding squeeze that freezes trade finance for poorer importers just when they need food and fuel most.
Each of these is survivable in isolation, with enough time, luck, and political will. The danger is their convergence: war raising energy prices, climate extremes hitting crops, cyber incidents stressing grids and hospitals, financial panic accelerating capital flight and austerity. What looks like four different domains—energy, food, digital, money—turns out to be one system with shared chokepoints and feedback loops.
In that light, the Cuba blackout and the Iran war are not separate stories. They are early chapters in the same book: a civilization that has made itself faster, taller, and more impressive by resting more and more of its weight on fewer and fewer supports, in an era when those supports are increasingly contested.
The politics that follow from this are not reassuring. Elites with access to buffers—diesel generators, private security, second passports, diversified portfolios—will push risk down the chain. Populations at the periphery of empires, or at the literal low‑lying edges of continents, will be asked to absorb the rolling blackouts, food rationing, and water cuts. Middle classes will be told stories about necessary sacrifice and external enemies. Some will believe them. Others will not.
None of this is inevitable in a metaphysical sense. It is the sum of choices about how to organize infrastructure, who owns and governs it, what risks are tolerated for profit and power, and whose lives are deemed expendable when something has to give.
What my work is already documenting—Cuba in the dark, an oil empire gambling with Hormuz—is that those choices are made now, often in secret, and almost always in ways that increase concentration and fragility rather than reduce it. Seen together, these are not isolated crises but the wiring diagram of how a modern civilization fails.
If there is a useful reframe for people trying to think clearly about “collapse,” it might be this:
Stop picturing a slow, gradual fading of modern life. Start picturing a series of sharp blows to a few overloaded cables—and the cascading, uneven fall of everything hanging from them.
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Collapse of Industrial Civilization 